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One Response to Ra’iisul Wasaare Dr. Cabdiweli oo la kulmay Ururada Dhalinyaradda.

1. Keerow iidow July 14, 2012 - 10:08 pm

   ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL
   Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
   We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing
   on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in
   accordance with paragraph 6 (m) of Security Council resolution
   2002 (2011).
   (Signed) Matt Bryden
   Coordinator
   Monitoring Group on Somalia
   and Eritrea
   (Signed) Emmanuel Deisser
   Arms Expert
   (Signed) Aurélien Llorca
   Aviation Expert
   (Signed) Jörg Roofthooft
   Maritime Expert
   (Signed) Ghassan Schbley
   Finance Expert
   (Signed) Babatunde Taiwo
   Armed Groups Expert
   (Signed) Kristele Younes
   Humanitarian Expert
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   Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)
   Contents
   Page
   Abbreviations 5 Summary 6
   I. Introduction 9
   A. Mandate 9
   B. Methodology 9
   II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia 11
   A. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption 11
   B. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin 14
   C. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat 15
   D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom (KFR) 16
   III. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo 19
   
   A. Foreign military operations in Somalia 20
   B. Private Security Companies (PSCs) 21
   C. Private Maritime Security Companies/ Floating Armouries 24
   D. Non-compliance 24
   IV. Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance 25
   A. Denial of access 25
   B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance 26
   C. Best practices 27
   V. Violations of International Humanitarian Law 27
   A. Attacks on civilians 28
   B. Gender-based violence (GBV) 28
   C. Child soldiers 29
   D. Forcible displacement or confinement 29
   VI. Consolidated list 30
   VII. State cooperation with the Monitoring Group 30
   VIII. Recommendations 31
   A. Threats to peace and security 31
   B. Piracy 31
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   C. Arms embargo violations 32
   D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance 33
   E. Violations of international humanitarian law 33 Annexes
   Somalia
   1. Misappropriation of financial resources 34
   1.1. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption 35 1.2. Passport production, corruption and fraud 59
   1.3. Currency printing 135
   2. Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin 146
   2.1. Al-Shabaab Charcoal Exports in 2011-12 147
   2.2. Al-Shabaab activities, tactics, techniques and procedures in 2011-12 163 2.3. Al-Shabaab Northeast Somalia (ASNE) 172
   3. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat 176
   3.1. Muslim Youth Centre (Al Hijra) (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 177 3.2. Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC), Tanzania 178
   4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom (KFR) 194
   4.1. Piracy overview: trends, judicial challenges and impunity 195 4.2. Kidnap for ransom (KFR) 213
   4.3. Indian Ocean Network (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 218
   4.4. Movement of piracy proceeds offshore (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 219
   5. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo 220 5.1. Violations of the arms embargo by air and related incidents 221
   
   5.2. Foreign military operations in Somalia 225
   5.3. Private Security Companies and Organizations (PSCs) 234
   5.4. Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and Floating Armouries 282 5.5. Non-compliant States and Organizations 286
   6. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance 299
   6.1. Obstruction to humanitarian assistance and attacks on aid workers August 2011- May 2012
   300
   6.2. ‘Gatekeepers’ and other forms of diversion of humanitarian assistance 314
   7. Violations of international humanitarian law 322 7.1. Attacks on civilians (CONFIDENTIAL) 323
   The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only. ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL
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   7.2. Gender-based violence (GBV) 325
   7.3. Recruitment and use of child soldiers 329
   7.4. Forced displacement, confinement and returns (CONFIDENTIAL) 331
   8. State cooperation with the Monitoring Group 332 ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL
   5 Abbreviations
   AIAI Al-Itihaad Al-Islam
   AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
   ARS Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
   ASWJ Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
   COTAM Commandement du transport aerién militaire FNDB Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi
   GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
   HHPN Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network
   ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
   IMB International Maritime Bureau
   ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
   IMO International Maritime Organization
   INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation NGO Non-Governmental Organization
   NSUM Northern Somali Unionist Movement
   OLF Oromo Liberation Front
   ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
   PMSC Private Maritime Security Company
   PPN Puntland Piracy Network
   PSC Private Security Company
   RPG Rocket-propelled grenade
   
   SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SSCA Sool Sanaag Cayn Army
   UIC Union of Islamic Courts
   UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia UNSOA United Nations Support Office for AMISOM UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
   WFP World Food Programme ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL
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   Summary
   The final year of the Transitional Federal Institutions’ (TFIs) term of office is due to expire in August 2012. But the transfer of power to a more effective, legitimate and broad-based nationalauthority is threatened by the efforts of diverse Somali political leaders and their supporters to hijack or derail the transitional process – outcomes that would fuel continued instability and conflict, potentially reviving the fortunes of an embattled Al-Shabaab.
   While such ‘spoiler’ behaviour is partly an expression of legitimate political competition, it is also symptomatic of pervasive corruption within the TFIs. Since the collapse of the Somali government in
   1991, successive generations of Somali leaders have engaged in corrosive political and economic practices that have aggravated the conflict and helped thwart the restoration of peace and security in the country. Under the Transitional Federal Institutions, the systematic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of public resources have essentially become a system of governance, embodied in the popular Somali phrase ‘Maxaa igu jiraa?’ (“What’s in it for me?”)
   A May 2012 report commissioned by the World Bank found US$131 million in TFG revenues unaccounted for in 2009-10: 68 per cent of total recorded income for that period. The Monitoring Group’s own investigations suggest that the real scale of corruption is probably even higher, since millions or dollars of revenue go unrecorded. In other words, out of every US$10 received by the TFG in 2009-10, US$7 never made it into state coffers. In 2011, almost one quarter of total TFG expenditure (over US$12 million) was absorbed by the offices of the three top leaders — the President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament. This represented roughly half of the TFG’s domestic income and almost as much as the government spends on security in a time of conflict. TFG leaders find other ways to profit from their official positions as well. The Monitoring Group has learned that production and issuance of national passports has been quietly awarded to TFG cronies, resulting in extensive corruption and fraud since 2007. In 2010-11 alone, almost US$1.5 million in passport revenues went missing.
   Despite the TFIs shortcomings, Al-Shabaab has suffered dramatic reverses over the past year, experiencing military defeats, the loss of territory and the erosion of its revenue base – setbacks that have exacerbated rifts within the group’s senior leadership and may yet push them to the point of rupture. Recent military successes against Al-Shabaab have mainly been delivered by foreign military forces, but international investment in Somali security sector institutions – notably the Somali National
   
   Security Force (NSF) is also beginning to produce results on the battlefield. Implementation of a United Nations ban on the importation of Somali charcoal would deliver another grave blow to Al- Shabaab’s revenue flow, further undermining its cohesion and ability to engage in armed conflict. But principal importers of Somali charcoal, notably the United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have so far failed to fulfill their obligations to enforce the ban imposed by Security Council resolution 2036 (2012).
   Al-Shabaab continues to represent a serious threat to peace, security and stability, not only in Somalia but also on the broader international scene. In February 2012, the group announced a merger with Al- Qaida and has been actively strengthening its ties with other foreign extremist groups, including the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) in Kenya, the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) in Tanzania and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen). Monitoring Group investigations reveal that the MYC in particular seeks to use its sanctuaries in Somalia as springboards for terrorist acts in Kenya, deploying
   several operational cells to Kenya in recent months for this purpose. ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL
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   Somali-based piracy threatens not only the peace, security and stability of Somalia, but regional and international security as well. Although pirates have been more active than ever in 2011, the adoption of Best Management Practices by the shipping industry, more effective international counter-piracy naval operations, and the increasing use of private maritime security companies (PMSCs) have substantially lowered the number of vessels successfully hijacked. As a result, pirates have to adapt and diversify, engaging in kidnap for ransom on land, and marketing their services as ‘counter piracy’ experts and ‘consultants’ in ransom negotiations. This evolution of the piracy business model is being driven largely by members of the Somali diaspora, whose foreign language skills, passports and bank accounts are all valuable assets. But the Monitoring Group has also been able to confirm the collusion of senior TFG officials in shielding a notorious pirate kingpin from prosecution, providing him with a diplomatic passport and describing him as a “counter-piracy” envoy.
   The pattern of arms embargo violations in Somalia has changed little over previous years. Arms markets in Yemen remained the principal source of supply of arms and ammunition for Somali nonstate armed groups. Contributions by foreign governments, mainly to the TFG but also to other authorities and militia forces, remained an important secondary source of supply. The most significant development with respect to the arms embargo has been the large-scale and sustained deployment of foreign military forces on Somali soil. Djiboutian forces, deployed in December 2011, have since been ‘rehatted’ as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Kenyan troops, which entered Somalia in October 2011, finally joined AMISOM in June 2012. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), which has mounted operations into much of southern and central Somalia since February 2012, has indicated that it intends to withdraw from those areas after handing over to AMISOM.
   Private security companies (PSCs) also remain problematic, with two currently providing support to non-statutory forces in north-eastern Somalia, while Mogadishu is increasingly populated by private ‘guard forces’ and at least one group of well-armed, foreign security forces protecting Turkish operations and personnel. The Monitoring Group remains deeply concerned by the operations of Sterling Corporate Services (formerly Saracen International), in northeast Somalia, and by the failure
   
   of certain Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent this sustained, large-scale violation of the Somalia arms embargo.
   Meanwhile, the relative importance of Eritrea as a source of military and financial support for armed groups appears to have declined. Enhanced international scrutiny of Eritrea’s actions in Somalia and the region, growing friction in Eritrea’s relationship with Al-Shabaab and the absence of other viable armed opposition groups all appear to have contributed to this trend. The Monitoring Group has found no evidence to substantiate allegations that Eritrea supplied Al-Shabaab with arms and ammunition by air in October and November 2011. However, the SEMG has established that Eritrea maintains relations with known arms dealers in Somalia and has violated the arms embargo during the course of the mandate by its support for Ethiopian armed opposition groups passing through Somali territory.
   From a humanitarian perspective, Somalia experienced its worst crisis since 1992-93, as drought and armed conflict conspired to create famine conditions in parts of the country. International efforts to assist distressed populations were hamstrung by a variety of obstacles: Al-Shabaab denied access to many UN agencies and Western aid organizations, and imposed draconian conditions on those it permitted to operate – while attempting to prevent civilians from migrating to areas where assistance would be available.
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   In TFG-controlled areas, where an estimated 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) sought help, government officials and local militias often acted as ‘gatekeepers’, controlling physical access to IDP settlements in order to inflate beneficiary numbers, divert assistance and prevent effective monitoring.
   International efforts to limit the scope for misappropriation of aid resources have been making progress: the Office of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator is putting in place a risk management system to help identify corrupt or underperforming contractors and implementing partners. Many agencies have also put in place third-party monitoring systems to verify aid delivery, but in some cases the Monitoring Group has learned that they – and their donors – have turned a blind eye to reports of diversion.
   The crisis in Somalia continues to be characterised by attacks on civilians, widespread rape and sexual assault, recruitment and use of child soldiers, and forcible displacement or confinement of vulnerable populations. But independent verification of such reports is severely hampered by lack of access, witnesses’ fear of reprisals, and a pervasive culture of denial – and occasional hostility – among Somali leaders and government officials. International mechanisms for information sharing and coordination of reporting are underdeveloped and severely circumscribed by concerns about source protection.
   As Somalia enters a new critical phase on the path to peace, security and stability, sanctions offer an important instrument of international and regional influence. On 1 May 2012, the United Nations, Africa Union and IGAD issued a joint statement, invoking Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), and warning that “those who stand against peace and progress in Somalia” could face “the immediate imposition of specific measures and restrictions.” For such threats to be credible, the Monitoring Group believes that individuals and entities it has identified as violating relevant Security Council resolutions should be designated with the least possible delay. To that end, it proposes several new additions to the consolidated list of the Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea.
   
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   I. Introduction
   A. Mandate
   1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is
   contained in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), which was adopted on 29 July 2011. Additional tasks were assigned to the Monitoring Group under resolutions 2023 (2012) and 2036 (2012).
   2. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (l) of resolution 2002 (2011), the Monitoring
   Group kept the Security Council and its Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea informed, throughout the period of its mandate, of its activities by submitting monthly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 3 February 2012.
   3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group
   travelled to Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. In Somalia, members of the Monitoring Group were able to visit Mogadishu, Baidoa, Puntland and Somaliland, but much of the south of the country remained inaccessible.
   4. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the
   following experts: Matt Bryden (Coordinator), Emmanuel Deisser (Arms), Aurélien Llorca (Aviation), Jörg Roofthooft (Maritime), Ghassan Schbley (Finance), Babatunde Taiwo (Armed Groups) and Kristele Younes (Humanitarian).
   B. Methodology
   5. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the
   previous reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the current mandate. The Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports (most recently, S/2011/433 of 18 July 2011). The methodology used for the current report is as follows:
   (a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources,
   where possible;
   (b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;
   (c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing
   
   existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
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   (d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with respect to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources; (e) Obtaining physical, photographic, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected.
   6. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge or who know people who have direct knowledge about details of violations.
   7. The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with
   relevant information, including government officials, representatives from diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. Members of the Monitoring Group met with a variety of Transitional Federal Government officials, officials from the Somaliland, Puntland and Gaalmudug administrations, other political and armed groups, and numerous members of Somali civil society. However, in a letter dated 14 August 2011, the TFG President designated the Monitoring Group’s Coordinator ‘persona non grata’ in Somalia. Several senior TFG officials with direct knowledge of this decision have informed the Monitoring Group that the letter was prepared upon the advice of Ms. Khadija Ossoble, an advisor to the TFG President who has been named in previous Monitoring Group reports.1 The Monitoring Group recommends that the Committee consider censuring President Sharif and Ms. Ossoble for attempting to obstruct the work of the Monitoring Group.
   8. In conformity with the guidance provided to us by the Committee on
   several occasions, the Monitoring Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in our final report. However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214 of 22 December 1997, 53/208 of 18 December 1998 and 59/265 of 23 December 2004, necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from being translated.
   9. In accordance with Secretary-General’s bulletin on ‘Information
   sensitivity, classification and handling’ (ST /SGB/2007/6) of 12 February 2007,
   the Monitoring Group has submitted to the Security Council Committee on
   Somalia and Eritrea, together with this report, several confidential annexes
   containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper
   functioning of the United Nations or the welfare and safety of its staff or third
   parties or violate the Organization’s legal obligations. These annexes will not be
   issued as an official document of the Security Council. 1 S/2003/1035, paras. 163-164; S/2010/91 paras 242-249
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   II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia*
   10. Since the SEMG’s July 2011 report (S/2011/433), Al-Shabaab’s fortunes have declined dramatically, ceding much of southern Somalia to the forces of AMISOM, Kenya and Ethiopia, and their local Somali allies. The loss of so much territory has also deprived Al-Shabaab of some lucrative border taxation points, and a Security Council ban on the importation of Somali charcoal threatens to further erode the group’s income. An anticipated joint offensive towards Kismaayo threatens to deprive Al-Shabaab of its single most important source of revenue as well as its principal training bases. Confronted by such pressures, serious rifts have emerged within the group’s leadership, threatening to produce a formal rupture, and Al-Shabaab fighters have begun to migrate northwards towards Puntland, Somaliland and Yemen. A steady trickle of foreign fighters is reported to be leaving Somalia.
   11. These successes may prove short-lived unless Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions are replaced by a more effective, legitimate and broadly based national authority when their mandate expires in August 2012. Unfortunately, TFI leaders have been reluctant to fulfill their transitional responsibilities under the national charter and some have proven actively obstructive, calling for a further extension of their own terms of office. While such ‘spoiler’ behaviour is partly an expression legitimate political competition, it is also symptomatic of pervasive corruption and the wholesale misappropriation of public financial resources.
   12. In this context, the Monitoring Group has focused its efforts on those Somali political and commercial ‘elites’ that have systematically undermined, distorted and corrupted decision-making processes within the TFIs for their own purposes, and who therefore represent the greatest threats to a successful and timely transition.
   A. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption
   13. During the more than two decades of conflict and statelessness since the collapse
   of the Somali government in 1991, successive generations of Somali leaders have engaged in corrosive political and economic practices that have aggravated the conflict and helped thwart the restoration of peace and security in the country. In its report of July 2011, the Monitoring Group noted that the TFG leadership’s political disarray, its endemic corruption and its resistance to power sharing represented the principal impediments to security and stabilization in southern Somalia.
   14. Security Council resolution 2002 (2011) specifically mandated the Monitoring Group to investigate the misappropriation of financial resources and other acts that
   * In paragraph 8 (a) of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), the Council prohibits acts
   that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008 or the political process or threaten the transitional federal institutions or AMISOM by force.
   
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   undermine the Transitional Federal Institutions’ ability to fulfill their obligations in delivering services within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement.
   15. Under the Transitional Federal Institutions, the systematic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of public resources have essentially become a system of governance. Somalia’s prospects for stabilization and effective governance have fallen prey to political and commercial ‘elites’ who appropriate, privatize and criminalize the core functions of the Somali state, enriching themselves while perpetuating a political economy of state collapse. The Monitoring Group has identified some of the most prominent among these ‘spoilers’.
   Misappropriation of financial resources: ‘Maxaa igu jiraa’
   16. Almost eight years since being established, the TFG’s public sector financial management practices remain chaotic and opaque. While this is in part due to lack of capacity, it is also the product of deliberate, systematic and often sophisticated behaviour, intended to prevent transparency or accountability. The TFG President, Speaker of Parliament and successive Prime Ministers, and public officials from the Cabinet level to the rank of District Commissioner, all bear responsibility, in varying degrees, for this state of affairs. As one senior official involved in TFG finances told the Monitoring Group: “Nothing gets done in this government without someone asking the question “Maxaa igu jiraa?” (“What’s in it for me?”)
   17. A report commissioned by the World Bank, published in May 2012, found that almost 68 per cent of TFG revenues in 2009-10 were unaccounted for. The Monitoring Group’s own investigations confirmed the involvement of senior TFG officials in the misappropriation of millions of dollars of domestic revenues and foreign aid, including contributions from Oman and South Sudan. Despite the efforts of some dedicated TFG officials to introduce greater transparency and accountability into the TFG’s financial arrangements, it is clear from the Monitoring Group’s investigations that the political will to enact such reforms is lacking in the highest echelons of government. A detailed treatment of corruption and the misappropriation of financial resources is contained in Annex 1.1.
   Passports
   18. The Somali passport has long lost most of its value as a travel document. As early as 2004, the Monitoring Group identified forged passports as a source of revenue for violators of the arms embargo.2 After the collapse of the Barre regime, Somali passports could be bought on the open market, and the integrity of the document collapsed. Few countries would accept the Somali passport, severely constraining economic activities and contributing to a sustained exodus to foreign countries, since a foreign passport
   represented not only a degree of security, but also an economic asset. 2 S/2004/604 page 25
   
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   19. The restoration of a widely acceptable travel document for Somalis is thus a
   priority of any national government, as much as a symbol of national revival as for its practical advantages. But corrupt TFG officials and their business associates have neatly transformed a noble objective into a corrupt moneymaking scheme characterized by corruption, fraud and potential threats to regional and international security.
   20. Senior TFG officials responsible for the introduction of a new passport conspired
   to award the contract without competition to an influential Somali businessman, as a means to generate profits and kickbacks. Any pretext of central control of the issuance process was deliberately eliminated in order to maximize the volume of passport sales and resulting profits. Officials in Somali embassies and passport ‘offices’ worldwide imposed extra charges and retained the proceeds for themselves. Between 2007-10, not a single dollar earned from passport sales reached the state Treasury; between July 2010 and December 2011, nearly US$1.5 million in revenues went unaccounted for, representing 60 per cent of the income from the project, and 6 per cent of total TFG domestic revenue for that year.
   21. Fraud and corruption became rampant in the passport business, with multiple passports being issued to the same individuals under false identities and foreigners obtaining Somali passports thanks to the intervention of senior TFG officials. Members of Al-Shabaab, including at least one senior leader, have allegedly received new passports, and the Monitoring Group has confirmed that one of Somalia’s most notorious pirate leaders received a diplomatic passport in his own name with the full knowledge of senior TFG officials.
   A detailed account of the passport production project is contained in Annex 1.2.
   Currency printing
   22. Currency printing has long been employed by Somali authorities as a means to generate quick revenues. But in the absence of effective monetary policy and regulatory controls, the practice is little better than counterfeiting, often with dramatic impact on the exchange rate and public savings. As early as 2003, the Monitoring Group described the practice as “the currency scam” and called upon member States to curb the printing of Somali banknotes.3
   23. Since 1992, the Monitoring Group has documented at least six episodes of
   currency printing, although many more are alleged to have taken place. The ‘government’ of Ali Mahdi Mohamed introduced paper currency in new denominations in June 1992, as did self-proclaimed ‘presidents’, Hussein Aydiid and Abdinur Darman in 1997. Rival Puntland leaders, Abdillahi Yusuf and Jaama Ali Jaama, both sought to purchase new banknotes between 1999 and 2002. In 2002, the Indonesian Police told the Monitoring Group that Khadija Ossoble Ali sought to procure banknotes on behalf of Somalia’s then
   Transitional National Government – a charge she denied. 3 S/2003/223, p.40 and S/2003/1035, p.36.
   
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   24. In January 2010, the then Minister of Finance Sharif Hassan (current TFG
   speaker) negotiated a deal with the Sudanese government and the Sudan Currency Printing Press (SCPP) to print new Somali banknotes worth the equivalent of between US$130 to US$150 million.
   25. In view of the pervasive corruption within the TFIs, the limitations of the TFG Central Bank and the absence of a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework or monetary policy, it is the assessment of the Monitoring Group that the planned introduction of this paper currency with less than six months remaining in the transitional process was intended to generate a political slush fund, enable large scale corruption and finance the ambitions of certain TFG leaders to interfere with the political process as defined by the Djibouti Agreement of 2010 and the Road Map.
   26. Despite concerns expressed by donors and the World Bank, and the resignation of
   the Governor of the Somali Central Bank over the scheme, senior TFG officials remained committed to the project. In March 2012, President Sharif visited Khartoum to assess progress. However, in June 2012, Prime Minister Abdiweli Gaas told the Monitoring Group that the introduction of the new currency had been suspended indefinitely (see also Annex 1.3.).
   B. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
   27. Although still a grave threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia, Al-
   Shabaab has suffered a series of reversals over the past year and has been significantly weakened by internal divisions. In August 2011, the group withdrew its forces from most of Mogadishu, and in October 2011, Kenyan forces, accompanied by a loose coalition of anti-Shabaab Somali militias, entered south western Somalia, securing long stretches of the common border. Ethiopian troops followed suit in November 2011, occupying parts of northern Gedo, and launching cross-border offensives in Bay, Bakool, Hiiraan and Gaalgaduud regions in March 2012. Under sustained military and economic pressure, Al- Shabaab has since ceded even more territory, and its leadership seems increasingly divided.
   Al-Shabaab Finances
   28. In February 2012, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 2036 (2012), which expanded AMISOM’s mandate, enlarged the size of the force, and banned the import of Somali charcoal – Al-Shabaab’s single most important source of revenue. The main importers of Somali charcoal – notably the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia –have been slow to implement the ban, and as of June 2012 large volumes of charcoal continued to leave the Al-Shabaab controlled ports of Baraawe and Marka for markets in Gulf Cooperation Council countries. But military offensives by AMISOM, Ethiopia and Kenya have deprived Al-Shabaab of control of lucrative taxation centres, including markets and border posts, eroding its revenue base (see Annex 2.1.).
   
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   Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
   29. Militarily, Al-Shabaab has generally declined to offer battle to foreign forces, avoiding sustained contacts and relying heavily on asymmetrical warfare techniques. Although the group continues to conduct raids and ambushes with some success in border areas, in Mogadishu its operations have been essentially confined to targeted killings, indirect fire and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), including suicide bombings. Al- Shabaab’s use of IEDs has been growing increasingly sophisticated, and there is growing evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab obtains expertise and/or IED components from outside Somalia (see Annex 2.2.).
   Al-Shabaab Northeast Somalia (ASNE)
   30. Al-Shabaab’s expansion northwards, as documented in the SEMG’s July 2011
   report, entered a new phase in February 2012, with the announcement in February 2012 that the ‘Mujahidiin of the Golis Mountains’, formerly headed by Mohamed Sa’iid ‘Atom’, had formally joined Al-Shabaab. Yasiin Khalid Osman ‘Kilwe’, a close associate of Al-Shabaab ‘Amir’ Ahmed Abdi Godane, declared himself the new leader of the group. Meanwhile, the Monitoring Group observed a steady influx of Al-Shabaab fighters from southern Somalia and the expansion of Al-Shabaab operations in Puntland, notably to the south of the port town of Bosaaso (see Annex 2.3.).
   C. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat
   31. Paradoxically, at precisely the moment that Al-Shabaab’s fortunes in Somalia
   have entered a phase of steep – possibly irreversible – decline, the group’s credibility and appeal appear to be growing among non-Somali extremists.
   Al-Qaida
   32. On 9 February 2012, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida issued a joint announcement of
   their formal merger. Al-Shabaab has long aspired to a partnership with Al-Qaida, and several of the most influential non-Somali figures associated with Al-Shabaab were alumni of Al-Qaida operations in East Africa: Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, and Abu Talha Al-Sudani. In September 2009, Al-Shabaab pledged its loyalty to Usama bin Laden, but received only praise and encouragement in return.
   33. Al-Shabaab’s declared relationship to Al-Qaida is unlikely to result in tangible benefits at a time when both groups are experiencing difficulties. But Al-Qaida’s endorsement of the Somali extremists may further enhance Al-Shabaab’s appeal abroad, and facilitate the forging of relationships with other Salafi-jihadi militants such as Al- Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Boko Haram in Nigeria – both of which have engaged with Al-Shabaab in the recent past.
   
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   Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) / Al Hijra
   34. In its July 2011 report, the Monitoring Group described in detail the existence of
   an Al-Shabaab support network in Kenya known as the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC). On 10 January 2012, Al-Shabaab announced a merger with the Kenya-based Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) and designated MYC ‘Amir’ Ahmed Iman Ali as Al-Shabaab’s representative for Kenyan affairs. MYC, which renamed itself Al-Hijra in early 2012, has continued to operate from Kenya with relative freedom, sending funds and recruits to Somalia in support of Al-Shabaab, while developing plans to conduct terrorist attacks inside Kenya and deploying several operational cells for this purpose.
   35. MYC relies heavily on the ideological guidance of prominent Kenyan Islamist extremists including Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a radical cleric based in Mombasa, Kenya, known associate of members of Al-Qaida East Africa and advocate of the violent overthrow of the Kenyan government. In consultation with Rogo, MYC has not only changed its name, but reorganized its membership and finances in order to permit its organization, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC) in Nairobi, to continue funding Al-Shabaab (see Annex 3.1.).
   Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC)
   36. The Tanzania-based Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) raises funds and recruits on behalf of Al-Shabaab. Headed by Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan, the AMYC is based in Tanga and draws upon an extensive network of mosques across Tanzania.
   37. Like the MYC in Kenya, the AMYC leadership is closely associated with the Kenyan extremist, Aboud Rogo, and many of its senior members were previously associated with the Al-Qaida-linked Tanzania office of the Al-Haramayn Foundation. However, AMYC collaborates closely with Tanga-based criminal networks, including a notorious drug smuggling ring, for the movement of Al-Shabaab recruits and trainers to and from Somalia (see Annex 3.2.).
   D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom (KFR)
   38. Somali maritime piracy – a form of money-driven, clan-based, transnational organized crime – remained a threat to global shipping in 2011 and 2012, and represented a humanitarian tragedy for hijacked seafarers and kidnapped hostages, their families and employers (see also Annex 4.1.). Approximately 245 people remain in the hands of Somali pirates today, both on land and sea.4
   39. Somali pirates have never been more active than in 2011, registering a total of
   237 incidents versus 219 in 2010. Most of this activity took place along Somalia’s eastern 4 UKMTO weekly report 19 – 25 May 2012.
   
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   and southern coasts, the Arabian Sea, and the Southern Red Sea, while pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden further declined.5
   40. However, the number of successful attacks dropped considerably, from 49 in
   2010 to just 28 in 2011 – a reduction of 43 per cent. Half of these hijackings occurred in the first two months of the year, followed by a steep drop-off, with only 6 successful attacks occurring between May and December 2011 (versus 28 during the same period in 2010).6 This downward trend continued in the first quarter of 2012, as the number of reported piracy incidents and successful attacks both declined.
   41. The decreasing success rate can probably be attributed to improvements in the implementation of Best Management Practices by the shipping industry, more effective international counter-piracy naval operations, and the increasing use of private maritime security companies (PMSCs).7
   42. Pirate militias have begun to adapt to this more hostile operating environment in a variety of ways. In central Somalia, pirate groups in have become involved in kidnapping for ransom on land, holding aid workers, journalists and tourists hostage. Pirate negotiators have begun marketing their services as ‘consultants’ and ‘experts’ on piracy and ‘consultants’, while exploring new types of criminal activity. A growing proportion of Somalis involved in piracy are members of the diaspora who hold dual nationality, and the Monitoring Group has identified several such individuals involved with pirate militia based near Harardheere. Some may also have ties to Al-Shabaab militants, Somali officials and private security companies involved in the counter piracy business
   43. Pirate groups remain active in Puntland, where they appear to face no serious threat from the Puntland administration, despite the recent establishment of a Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) with financial assistance from the UAE.
   Kidnap for Ransom
   44. The declining success of Somali pirate operations at sea may have contributed to more frequent kidnapping for ransom (KFR) on land, a trend that accelerated in September 2011 as foreign tourists, aid workers and a journalist were abducted in Kenya and Somalia before being transferred to the custody of Somali pirates (see annex 4.2.).
   45. One of the pirate groups to have become involved in both KFR and ‘consulting’ is
   the Indian Ocean Network: a sub-group of the Harardheere-Hobyo Piracy Network
   (HHPN) (see annexes 4.2. and 4.3.).
   5 Data registered by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Incidents include vessels being hijacked, fired upon, boarded but not hijacked, and attempted attacks.
   6 This represented a total of 470 seafarers taken hostage in 2011, of whom 3 were injured and 8 killed, a decline from 1016 seafarers taken hostage in 2010, of whom reportedly 13 were injured and 8 killed.
   7 Suggested Planning and Operational Practices for Ship Operators and Masters of Ships Transiting the High Risk Area (BMP version 4 – August 2011: Best Management Practises for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy).
   
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   Movement of piracy proceeds offshore
   46. Investigating the movements and investments of piracy proceeds, the Monitoring Group has identified several financial transfers between Somali pirates and individuals in the Somali diaspora, linked to a number of hijacking cases such as the Al Khaliq (2010), Orna (2010), Irene SL (2011), Zirku (2011), Rosalio D’Amato (2011) and Enrico Ievoli (2011) (see Annex 4.4.).
   Judicial challenges: collusion, protection and immunity
   47. The international community has dedicated enormous resources – political, military, intelligence and financial – to combating Somali piracy in recent years. Three large international task forces and a dozen independent, national missions are currently engaged in maritime counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.8 However, such efforts are handicapped by the various judicial and legal obstacles that impede the investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of pirate leaders and kingpins.
   48. The 125 registered hijacking cases attributed to Somali pirates since 16 December 2008 have affected at least 83 different countries, all of whom would in theory be entitled to prosecute individuals who have cause harm to their citizens or national interests. Moreover, although 20 countries currently detain suspected Somali pirates in custody with a view to prosecution, not more than 10 of these governments have actually taken the initiative to undertake broader investigations into Somali pirate networks. As a result, the international community is investing enormous resources to pursue and punish those at the bottom of the piracy pyramid – most of whom are impoverished, functionally illiterate youth who are easily replaced – while virtually guaranteeing impunity for those at the top of the piracy pyramid who bear greatest responsibility and profit the most.
   49. Similarly, attempts to impose targeted sanctions against senior Somali pirate figures have been thwarted in the UN Security Council. Since April 2010, the United Kingdom has placed a technical hold on proposed sanctions against pirate leaders to ensure that payments of ransoms remain legal.
   50. Some pirates also benefit from the collusion and protection of high-level government officials. In early April 2012, Malaysian immigration authorities identified Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’,9 one of the most notorious and influential leaders of the Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network (HHPN),10 traveling with a Somali ‘diplomatic passport’ to visit his wife and family living abroad.11 In response to questions about his diplomatic status and the purpose of his trip Afweyne presented the authorities with an
   apparently official document issued by the Director of the TFG Presidency (Chief of 8 NATO, EU NAVFOR, CMF-TF151 and independent naval task forces such as China, Russia, India, Iran, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
   9 Reportedly on 10 April 2012.
   10 Central Somalia, Mudug region
   11 Passport number obtained by the Monitoring Group.
   
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   Cabinet), Mohamed Moalim Hassan, with knowledge of TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The document stated that Afweyne was involved in counter-piracy activities on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for ‘Himan & Heeb’ region.12 Upon his return to Mogadishu a week later, Afweyne was reportedly
   summoned to the Presidency. The Monitoring Group has since obtained confirmation of Afweyne’s status as a TFG ‘diplomat’ and corresponding possession of a diplomatic passport issued by TFG-officials with the authorization of Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,13 implying that ‘Afweyne’, enjoys protection from the highest echelons within the TFG (see also annex 1.2.). The TFG President informed the Monitoring Group that Afweyne’s diplomatic status was one of several inducements intend to obtain the dismantling of his pirate network.
   Top pirate leader and ‘TFG diplomat’ Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’
   III. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo14
   51. The pattern of arms embargo violations in Somalia has changed little since
   previous mandates. Arms markets in Yemen remained the principal source of arms and ammunition for Somali non-state armed groups. Contributions by foreign governments, mainly to the TFG but also to other authorities and militia forces, remained an important
   secondary source of supply.
   12 The letter was emailed to Malaysia on Afweyne’s request. Although the Monitoring Group has yet to obtain a copy of the document, this information has been independently confirmed to the Monitoring Group by reliable Government sources from three different countries.
   13 The Monitoring Group possesses all details of Afweyne’s passport application. Authorization confirmed by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed during a meeting with the Monitoring Group in Nairobi on 22 June 2012.
   14 In paragraph 8 (b) of its resolution 1844 (2008), the Security Council prohibits acts that violate
   the general and complete arms embargo imposed by the Council in resolution 733 (1992).
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   52. The relative importance of Eritrea as a source of military and financial support for armed opposition groups appears to have declined. Enhanced international scrutiny of Eritrea’s actions in Somalia and the region, growing friction in Eritrea’s relationship with Al-Shabaab and the absence of other viable armed opposition groups have all contributed to this trend.
   53. The Monitoring Group has found no evidence to substantiate allegations that
   Eritrea supplied Al-Shabaab with arms and ammunition by air in October and November 2011 (see Annex 5.1). However, the Group has established that Eritrea maintains relations with known arms dealers in Somalia and has violated the arms embargo during the course of the mandate by its support for of Ethiopian armed opposition groups passing through Somali territory.
   54. The activities of private security companies (PSCs) and their state or corporate sponsors is of growing concern. Two such companies are currently engaged in support to private Somali militias (a third company ceased operations in early 2011), whose primary purpose is to safeguard narrow commercial and political interests. The extension and
   
   possible expansion of this trend over the long term could have grave implications for the security and stability of Somalia.
   A. Foreign military operations in Somalia
   55. Operations in Somali territory by foreign military forces constituted an important category of embargo violation during the course of the past mandate. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti all conducted large scale military operations in Somalia without prior authorization from the Committee. Djiboutian forces have since been ‘rehatted’ as AMISOM troops and Kenya formally merged its forces with AMISOM on 2 June 2012, bringing the status of their forces into compliance with the sanctions regime.
   56. Ethiopia has deployed forces to Somalia in 2011-12, and provides military assistance to allied militias. Ethiopia has announced that it does not intend to place its troops under AMISOM command, meaning that its operations in Somalia currently constitute a violation of the arms embargo.
   57. Unidentified Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) routinely operate in Somali airspace. The Monitoring Group currently considers UAVs to be of an exclusively military nature; their importation to and use in Somalia therefore represents as potential violation of the arms embargo.
   58. A detailed account of foreign military operations in Somalia, including the
   operation of UAVs, is contained in Annex 5.2.
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   B. Private Security Companies (PSCs)
   59. Numerous private security companies (PSCs) currently operate in Somalia, with several providing, or intending to provide, support to Somali security sector institutions. Since external assistance to Somali security sector institutions must follow the procedures stipulated in Security Council resolution 1772 (2007), the provision of such assistance, in the absence of authorization from the Committee, constitutes a violation of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council resolution 733 (1992).
   60. In this connection, the Monitoring Group is concerned that Member States
   routinely fail to fulfill their obligations under paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), which requires them to take the necessary measures to prevent “the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical assistance or training, financial or other assistance” to Somalia. The Monitoring Group has identified several countries currently serving as logistical hubs for PSC operations in Somalia in violation of resolutions 733 (1992) and 1844 (2008), namely: Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates.
   
   Sterling Corporate Services / Saracen International Lebanon
   61. In late 2011, the assets, personnel and operations of Saracen International
   Lebanon were transferred to Sterling Corporate Services (SCS), reportedly a Dubairegistered
   company, which resumed large-scale military training, technical assistance and
   support to the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Established in May 2010, with the involvement of Erik Dean Prince, the American founder of Blackwater U.S.A., this externally-financed assistance programme has remained the most brazen violation of the arms embargo by a PSC.
   62. In 2011, Saracen’s training camp near Bosaaso became the best-equipped military facility in Somalia after AMISOM’s bases in Mogadishu. The SCS base today includes a modern operational command centre, control tower, airstrip, helicopter deck and about 70 tents, which can host up to 1,500 trainees.
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   SCS camp at Qaw / Bandar Siyada, west of Bosaaso, in October 2011
   63. Thanks to this massive initiative, the Puntland Maritime Police Force is now a well-equipped elite force, over 1,000 strong, with air assets used to carry out ground attacks, that operates beyond the rule of law and reports directly to the President of Puntland. This private army disingenuously labeled a ‘counter-piracy’ force, has been financed by zakat contributions mainly from high-ranking officials from the United Arab Emirates, including Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The UAE government, however, has officially denied any involvement in the project.15
   64. Without the intervention of its state sponsor, there is no realistic prospect of this initiative receiving authorization from the Committee, meaning that it will continue to represent a flagrant breach of the sanctions regime on Somalia, characterized by a disturbing lack of transparency, accountability or regard for international law. A detailed study of Sterling Corporate Services/ Saracen International operations in Puntland is contained in Annex 5.3.a.
   Pathfinder
   65. In August 2011, the South Africa-based Pathfinder Corporation was contracted by
   Africa Oil, via its local subsidiaries, to provide security advice and risk analysis.
   Pathfinder personnel on the ground liaise with local authorities in charge of security and
   15 Meeting with a representative of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abu Dhabi, 25 March 2012.
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   oversee the Exploration Security Unit (ESU), a special branch of the Puntland security forces established to protect oil exploration and exploitation.16
   ESU camp and Horn Petroleum drilling site and ESU camp south of Bosaaso,
   15 February 2012
   
   66. Pathfinder’s transparency and its efforts to comply with the sanctions regime arguably represent ‘best practices’ for PSCs in Somalia. However, its ‘temporary issue’ of military equipment and the direct funding of the ESU by Africa Oil (via its subsidiary, Canmex) constitute violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).
   67. A detailed study of Pathfinder operations in Puntland is contained in Annex 5.3.b.
   Bancroft Global Development
   68. The Washington DC-based charity Bancroft Global Development, operating in Somalia under the auspices of AMISOM, is currently the only private company providing assistance to Somali security sector institutions in conformity with resolution 1772 (2007).
   69. On 28 March 2012, the Monitoring Group conducted, at Bancroft’s invitation, a field assessment of Bancroft operations in Mogadishu, visiting four different locations where Bancroft personnel are currently deployed. A case study relating to this inspection is included in Annex 5.3.c.
   Other security providers
   16 On 15 February 2012, the Monitoring Group conducted, at the company’s invitation, a field assessment of Pathfinder operations in Puntland.
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   70. A growing number of foreign private security personnel and companies in
   Somalia provide security details for individuals, foreign companies, diplomatic missions, INGOs and International Organizations. They supervise local militias, provide armed escorts and static guards, often importing armoured vehicles, personal protective equipment (PPE) and operating in an arguably paramilitary fashion.
   71. Many external actors also contract private militias to provide local protection: a common practice among diplomats, international NGOs workers, journalists, foreign contractors and businessmen visiting Mogadishu. Since November 2011, the United Nations has also engaged a private local militia in Mogadishu to protect the movements of its staff (see Annex 5.5.).
   C. Private Maritime Security Companies / Floating Armouries
   72. The unmonitored and largely unregulated activities of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) off the coast of Somalia, offering armed protection to ships and crews traversing the High Risk Area (HRA),17 may represent a new potential channel for the flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia and the region.
   73. During the course of the Monitoring Group’s mandate, this highly profitable business has expanded beyond the provision of armed escorts to the leasing of arms, ammunition and security equipment, and the establishment of ‘floating armouries’ that operate in international waters beyond the remit of any effective international regulatory authority. PMSCs are currently holding approximately 7,000 weapons in circulation, which are either owned or leased. 18
   
   74. The absence of control and inspection of armed activities inevitably creates opportunities for illegality and abuse, and increases the risk that the maritime security industry will be exploited by unscrupulous and criminal actors, eventually coming to represent a threat to regional peace and security, rather than part of the solution. A detailed analysis of PMSCs and floating armouries can be found in Annex 5.4.
   D. Non-compliance
   75. Non-compliance by Member States and International Organizations has become a growing problem in Somalia over the past year.
   76. The Monitoring Group has documented 144 flights to Somalia operated on behalf
   of 12 Member States, either of a military nature or in apparent connection with support to
   Somali security sector institutions that have not been notified to the Committee on 17 The area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E, which comprises the
   Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and parts of the wider Indian Ocean.
   18 Legal weapons, albeit some unregistered, 90% of which are semi-automatic rifles.
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   Somalia and Eritrea, and therefore represent potential technical violations of the arms embargo.19
   77. During the course of the mandate, Ethiopia, France, Sudan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Nations and the United States have all provided support to Somali security sector institutions without providing prior notice or obtaining advance authorization from the Committee. Such actions potentially violate the arms embargo imposed pursuant to Security Council resolution 733 (1992) and contravene the procedures stipulated by resolution 1772 (2007) regarding the provision of support to Somali security sector institutions.
   78. Incidents of non-compliance are listed in Annex 5.5.
   IV. Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance
   79. Deteriorating food security conditions as a result of both drought and conflict led
   the United Nations to declare a famine in Somalia on 20 July 2011.20 Crisis conditions continued into the first half of 2012.
   80. Efforts to assist distressed populations encountered numerous obstacles: in Al- Shabaab controlled areas, Western aid agencies were generally denied access or were required to accept unacceptable restrictions on their ability to operate and monitor activities. In areas under the control of the TFG, aid agencies struggled to adapt to a complex environment dominated by a system of “gatekeepers”, new donors and a general lack of control on the part of the central authorities. The delivery of humanitarian assistance was further complicated by international military operations conducted by the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia, and by AMISOM.
   
   A. Denial of access
   81. The deteriorating humanitarian conditions and the declaration of the famine prompted many international NGOs to attempt to establish themselves in Mogadishu in the first half of 2011, or to base international staff members in Somalia for the first time in years. These attempts met with limited success given the security constraints.
   82. Despite the crisis situation, Al-Shabaab did not relax the restrictions imposed on
   aid agencies.21 On 28 November 2011, the group banned 16 international NGOs and UN agencies from operating in areas under its control and seized 22 compounds and assets belonging to these agencies.22 The ban was followed by the imposition of new ‘taxes’ on
   remaining agencies in December 2011, and the expulsion of the International Committee 19 According to flight plans submitted to the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS)
   between 26 July 2011 and 25 May 2012.
   20 See: http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/PressRelease_%20UNdeclares_famine_Somalia_%20En.pdf.
   21 Interviews with several humanitarian agencies officers, Nairobi, December 2011. 2
   2 See: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40539.
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   of the Red Cross on 30 January 2012.23 International agencies, which continued to work in southern Somalia throughout 2011-12 reported constant harassment by Al-Shabaab officials.
   83. A detailed list of obstructive incidents can be found in Annex 6.1.
   B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance Gatekeepers
   84. In TFG-controlled areas, aid agencies seeking to respond to crisis conditions encountered a variety of sophisticated strategies to attract, control and divert humanitarian assistance. The most pervasive and subtle of these involved the role of IDP camp managers and district officials as ‘gatekeepers’ to control physical access, manage aid resources and prevent effective monitoring of the use of aid.24
   85. Such tactics, combined with adverse security conditions, undermined the ability
   of aid organizations to verify whether aid was actually reaching the intended beneficiaries or if those beneficiaries even existed. Reports by third party monitors engaged by some aid agencies to overcome such challenges present a mixed assessment, confirming that diversion was indeed a serious problem25 but that in some cases aid agencies and donors chose to ignore or bury reports to this effect.26
   86. The exploitation of civilians as pawns to attract aid resources was further compounded by the modus operandi of many aid agencies who, with the support of donors, often worked through gatekeepers, employing them as staff or even as implementing partners. One Somali NGO, Saacid, went so far as to place all of Mogadishu’s 16 District Commissioners on its payroll (see also Annex 6.2.).
   87. Similar problems were reported in zones controlled by foreign military forces and
   
   allied Somali militias. Whereas humanitarian organizations sought to operate independently in these areas, foreign military commanders typically perceived humanitarian assistance as a potential ‘hearts and minds’ dimension of their campaign, and local Somali leaders sought to exercise control over aid resources.27
   88. Diversion of humanitarian assistance occurred in Al-Shabaab controlled areas as well, and agencies struggled to find ways to avoid paying direct taxes to Al-Shabaab. Although many agencies found ways to work independently with the support of local communities, others ended up paying the required taxes to maintain their presence on the
   ground. Incidents of looting of supplies by Al-Shabaab groups took place regularly, and 23 See: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/somalia-news-2012-02-02.htm.
   24 Interviews with aid agencies and donors, Nairobi and Mogadishu, December 2011-April 2012.
   25 Interviews with third party monitors, Mogadishu, 13 March 2012.
   26 Interviews with IDPs in several camps in Mogadishu, August-October 2011. 27 Interviews with UN heads of agencies, Nairobi, April 2012.
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   forced ICRC to suspend its distribution activities on 12 January 2012, leading to its eventual ban by Al-Shabaab on 30 January 2012.28
   C. Best practices
   89. Despite the challenges, aid agencies and donors have taken significant and encouraging measures to combat diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The use of ‘third party’ monitoring mechanisms has become widespread, especially among agencies involved in the delivery of food aid, although the effectiveness of such monitoring varies.
   90. The Office of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator has established a Risk Management Unit (RMU) for the UN Country Team (UNCT), which manages a database of contracts entered into by UN agencies. The RMU’s plans include establishing minimum standards of due diligence that all agencies should adhere to before entering into a contract with any entity, and identification of problematic or risky implementing partners and contractors. The RMU is also promoting standard clauses in UN agency contracts to the effect that partners risk termination if they are found to have engaged in improper behaviour by any member of the UN family. The RMU also offers UN agencies, upon request, a review of their contracting processes complementing the internal controls applied by individual agencies.29
   91. Despite the RMU’s efforts, the UN country team has not yet agreed on a systemwide approach to contractors or implementing partners that have been identified as problematic.30 Finally, even though the largest agencies have provided information regarding their contacts to the RMU, only 8 out of 24 UN agencies working in Somalia are now participating in the system.
   92. Moreover, despite these improvements, resistance or denial within some agencies means that problems may be identified, but n

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